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RECIPROCAL DEALING: A REBIRTH?
EDWARD D. CAVANAGHt
INTRODUCTION
Reciprocal dealing, also known as reciprocity, describes ways
in which a buyer may unlawfully use its economic position in one
market coercively to secure a competitive advantage in another.
Reciprocity typically refers to the use of the buyer's power as
buyer of product A to induce the supplier of A to purchase
buyer's product B. More colloquially, reciprocity "exists when
one party tells the other: 'Il buy from you, if you buy from
me.'"' For example, auto maker ABC may say to USX that it
would buy steel from USX if USX would buy ABC trucks.
Another example of reciprocity is an agreement by a seed
producer to buy products grown from its seed if and only if the
farmer growing the product purchases its seed from the seed
producer. The reciprocity label is also used in the situation in
which a party conditions its decision to purchase (or sell) product
A on the willingness of the supplier (or customer) to sell product
B to it.
Reciprocity has long been recognized as "one of the congeries
of anticompetitive practices at which the antitrust laws are
aimed."2 The earliest cases, dating back to the 1930s, involved
challenges to reciprocal dealing by the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) as an unfair method of competition.3 Since
that time, reciprocal dealing has been attacked under the
antitrust laws on three fronts: (1) under section 1 of the
Sherman Act 4 as a restraint of trade analogous to unlawful
t Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law; J.S.D., LL.M.,
Columbia University; J.D., Cornell University; A.B., University of Notre Dame.
1 Brokerage Concepts, Inc. v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 140 F.3d 494, 511 (3d Cir.
1998).
2 FTC v. Consol. Foods Co., 380 U.S. 592, 594 (1965).
3 See, e.g., In re Cal. Packing Corp., 25 F.T.C. 379 (1937); In re Mech. Afg. Co.,
16 F.T.C. 67 (1932).
4 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
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tying; (2) under section 2 of the Sherman Act 5 as unlawful
monopolization and attempted monopolization; and (3) under
section 7 of the Clayton Act.6 At the height of its popularity in
the late 1960s and early 1970s, reciprocal dealing was widely
viewed as anticompetitive and reciprocity theory was used by
federal antitrust enforcers to challenge conglomerate mergers
and to challenge certain corporate buying practices as
exclusionary. 7 In these enforcement efforts, the government
enjoyed some modest success and was able to obtain consent
decrees ending reciprocal dealing practices.8
The view that reciprocal dealing posed a threat to
competition, however, was not unanimous. Thomas Kauper was
skeptical about reciprocity as a theory of competitive harm, and
under his leadership (1972-76), the Antitrust Division began to
5 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
6 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2000).
7 See, e.g., Stephen J. Dunne, Reciprocity: The Hazards of Backscratching, 11
WILLIAMEITE L.J. 159 (1974); Milton Handler, Emerging Antitrust Issues:
Reciprocity, Diversification and Joint Ventures, 49 VA. L. REV. 433 (1963); Robert M.
Hausman, Reciprocal Dealing and the Antitrust Laws, 77 HARV. L. REV. 873 (1964);
Richard W. McLaren, Reciprocity: The 'Hobgoblin" of the Antitrust Critics, 39
ANTITRUST L.J. 224 (1969). But see Richard S. Markovits, Tie-ins, Reciprocity and
the Leverage Theory, 76 YALE L.J. 1397 (1967) (questioning the legal bases for
attacking reciprocity).
8 See, e.g., United States v. Grow Chem. Corp., 1974-1 Trade Cas. (CCI-)
75,133 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); United States v. Contl Can Co., 1974-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 91
75,132 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); United States v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 1973-1 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 74,338 (W.D. Mo. 1973); United States v. Crane Co., 1973-1 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 74,329 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
1973-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 74,574 (W.D. Pa. 1973); United States v. Jackson's
Atlanta Ready Mix Concrete Co., 1972 Trade Cas. (CCH) 73,827 (N.D. Ga. 1972);
United States v. Martin Marietta Corp., 1972 Trade Cas. (CCH) % 73,858 (D. Md.
1972); United States v. Uniroyal Inc., 1972 Trade Cas. (CCH) %1 74,070 (S.D.N.Y.
1972); United States v. Owens-Ill., Inc., 1972 Trade Cas. (CCH) 73,828 (N.D. Ohio
1972); United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 1972 Trade Cas. (CCH) %1 74,053
(W.D. Pa. 1972); United States v. H.K. Porter Co., 1972 Trade Cas. (CCH) 73,917
(W.D. Pa. 1972); United States v. T.I.M.E.-DC., Inc., 1972 Trade Cas. (CCH)
74,069 (N.D. Tex. 1972); United States v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 1971 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 9 73,437 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 1971 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 73,587 (W.D. Pa. 1971); United States v. Natl Steel Corp., 1971 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 73,495 (W.D. Pa. 1971); United States v. Reynolds Metal Co., 1971
Trade Cas. (CCH) 91 73,626 (E.D. Va. 1971); United States v. Inland Steel Co., 1970
Trade Cas. (CCH) 91 73,197 (N.D. i. 1970); United States v. Republic Steel Corp.,
1970 Trade Cas. (CCH) %1 73,246 (N.D. Ohio 1970); United States v. Armco Steel
Corp., 1970 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 73,283 (S.D. Ohio 1970); United States v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 1970 Trade Cas. (CCH) 91 73,376 (E.D. Pa. 1970); United
States v. PPG Indus., Inc., 1970 Trade Cas. (CCH) 91 73,373 (W.D. Pa. 1970).
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re-examine its approach to reciprocal dealing. Kauper did not
view reciprocal dealing as sufficiently pernicious as to warrant
per se condemnation and argued that reciprocal dealing
practices should not be challenged by the government absent
proof of anticompetitive effect on consumers. The Antitrust
Division ceased initiating reciprocity cases. At about the same
time, reciprocity as a theory of antitrust wrongdoing also came
under heavy attack from antitrust scholars 9 and, until recently,
has remained largely dormant.10
Reciprocity, however, may be in the midst of a rebirth, albeit
in 1990s dress. Reciprocity claims were upheld as per se
unlawful under section 1 of the Sherman Act and also violative
of section 2 of the Sherman Act by the trial court in Intergraph
Corp. v. Intel Corp." wherein plaintiff had alleged that Intel
Corporation ("Intel") had declined to sell microprocessors unless
plaintiff licensed certain technology to Intel free of charge. The
trial court's decision in Intergrap is intriguing. First, Intergraph
is a natural extension of the Supreme Court's ruling in Eastman
Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc.12 on leveraging and
provides plaintiffs a plausible theory of exclusionary
anticompetitive harm. Second, and more specifically, Intergraph
arms equipment purchasers and independent service
organizations (ISO) with another weapon to utilize in their
ongoing battle with original equipment manufacturers (OEM).
Third, the decision tends to level the playing field in the give-
and-take of purchase negotiations by limiting OEMs in the terms
that they can extract as part of a sale. Fourth, OEMs facing
reciprocity may encounter even more difficulty in disposing of
claims by motion or on summary judgment.
This article will examine the retooled reciprocity theory and
the anticompetitive potential of reciprocal dealing practices
under the law of (1) mergers, (2) monopolization, and (3) tying.
9 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Antitrust Law Enforcement in the Vertical
Restraints Area: Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53 ANTITRUST L.J.
135, 144 (1984) (criticizing leverage objection to reciprocity as "naive").
10 See Donald I. Baker & William Blumenthal, The 1982 Guidelines and
Preexisting Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 311, 339 (1983) (stating that the merger guidelines
do not mention reciprocity because of the unwillingness of several successive
Federal Trade Commission administrations to bring such cases).
11 3 F. Supp. 2d 1255 (N.D. Ala. 1998), vacated, 195 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
12 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
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I. BACKGROUND TO RECIPROCITY: MERGER LAW
The case law on reciprocity is sparse. The Supreme Court
has spoken on the issue directly only once, and that was in the
context of a merger. In FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp.,13 the
Supreme Court set aside the acquisition of Gentry, a
manufacturer of dehydrated onion and garlic, by Consolidated
Foods Corporation ("Consolidated Foods"), the owner of a food
processing plant and wholesale and retail food stores, because
the acquisition would likely encourage reciprocal dealing.14
Consolidated Foods, the acquiring company, purchased products
of food processors that, in turn, purchased dehydrated onion and
garlic in preparing or packaging food.15 The Supreme Court
expressed concern that the merger would create reciprocal
buying patterns in which prospective suppliers to Consolidated
Foods would purchase their requirements of dehydrated onion
and garlic from Consolidated Foods' new subsidiary, Gentry,
thereby insulating Gentry from competition in dehydrated onion
and garlic on the merits.16 The Supreme Court stated: "If
reciprocal buying [by a customer of Consolidated Foods] creates
for Gentry a protected market, which others cannot penetrate
despite superiority of price, quality, or service, competition is
lessened...."17
The Court further noted that an acquisition which facilitates
reciprocity is anticompetitive because that acquisition imports
"'an irrelevant and alien factor'... intruding into the choice
among competing products, creating at least 'a priority on the
business at equal prices.' "18 As a result, inferior goods may be
insulated from vigorous competition and may deprive a superior
product of access to a supplier. 19 Equally important, a potential
rival may suffer antitrust injury because it has been foreclosed
from meaningful access to the market.20
In the wake of Consolidated Foods, the lower courts
proceeded cautiously and have applied a three-prong test in
13 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
14 See id. at 593-94.
15 See id. at 595.
16 See id. at 593.
17 Id. at 599.
18 Id. at 594 (citations omitted).
19 See id. at 598-99.
20 See id. at 597.
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determining whether a merger is unlawful because it promotes
reciprocity:
First, the merger must significantly increase the opportunities
for reciprocal dealing by creating a market structure conducive
to reciprocity or reciprocity effect;
Second, there must be a reasonable probability that those
opportunities will be exploited; and
Third, the resulting reciprocal dealings, ff any, must have a
tendency substantially to lessen competition. 21
Consolidated Foods thus poses a formidable hurdle to
plaintiffs challenging a merger on a reciprocity theory. This
demanding standard explains in part the low visibility of the
reciprocity theory in merger enforcement.22 Indeed, the last
challenge to a conglomerate merger on reciprocity grounds was
in 1971, and the government lost.23 A more fundamental, and
perhaps more compelling, explanation for the virtual
disappearance of Consolidated Foods is that conglomerate
mergers in general are no longer viewed as a significant
competitive threat; and pure conglomerate mergers today are
almost never challenged. 24
II. RECIPROCITY REBORN: THE NEW LAW OF MONOPOLIZATION?.
Consolidated Foods is the one and only time that the
Supreme Court addressed reciprocal dealing. Historically, as
more fully discussed below, reciprocity actions have been
confined to section 1 of the Sherman Act and viewed as
analogues to tying. However, recent case law developments,
specifically the Ninth Circuit's decision in Eastman Kodak2 and
21 Carrier Corp. v. United Tech. Corp., 1978-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) [ 62,393, at
76,371 (N.D.N.Y. 1978).
22 See Spencer Weber Waller, Can U.S. Antitrust Laws Open International
Markets?, 20 NW. J. INTL. L. & Bus. 207, 220 (2000) (stating that after the
Consolidated Foods Corp. decision there was a flood of litigation which eventually
subsided).
23 See United States v. ITT Corp., 1971 Trade Cas. (CCH) a 73,169 (N.D. Ill.
1971).
2 See Baker & Blumenthal, supra note 11, at 339 (stating that challenges to
conglomerate mergers are steadily declining and most conglomerate violations
theories "fallen into disfavor and disuse").
25 Image Technical Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195 (9th
Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1094 (1998).
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the district court holding in Intergraph26 have created renewed
interest in reciprocity as a theory to attack monopolistic
behavior.27 In the Eastman Kodak case, Eastman Kodak
Corporation ("Kodak") instituted a sales policy under which it
would sell Kodak replacement parts only to those customers who
would agree to use Kodak maintenance services.28 But for the
conditions dictated by Kodak, many of its customers would have
preferred to buy maintenance services from independent service
organizations (ISO) which were cheaper and of a higher quality
than those offered by Kodak.29 Forced to make a hard choice,
most customers opted to abandon the ISOs. The Ninth Circuit
made clear that Kodak's attempt to leverage its monopoly over
replacement parts into a monopoly in the servicing of Kodak
equipment, thereby excluding independent service organizations
from maintaining Kodak machines, constituted unlawful
monopolization.8 0
The trial court in Intergraph took the Eastman Kodak.
holding one step farther. 31 Intergraph' Corporation's
("Intergraph) business was the design and production of
graphics subsystems, which are critical systems for high-end
workstations used by graphics and design engineers and
graphics artists.32 Intel sold Intergraph microprocessors-the
"brains" of the computer-for use in its graphics subsystems and
provided technical information about Intel's products. 3
Intergraph had its own microprocessors-the Clipper
technology-but chose to abandon development of Clipper
technology in favor of Intel products as technical innovations
evolved.3 4 In the meantime, Intel became a competitor of
Intergraph in graphic subsystems.3 5 Intel began to condition its
sale of microprocessors and the providing of technical
information on Intergraph's agreement to license the Clipper
26 3 F. Supp. 2d 1255 (N.D. Ala. 1998), rev'd, 195 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
27 See Waller, supra note 22, at 221 (asserting that the Supreme Court is
responding favorably to new theories of exclusive dealing).
28 Eastman Kodak, 125 F.3d at 1201.
29 See id.
30 Id. at 1208.
31 See Intergraph, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 1278-79.
32 See id. at 1270.
33 See id. at 1269.
34 See id. at 1263-64.
35 See id.
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technology free of charge to Intel.36 Intergraph balked at this
demand, and its supply of microprocessors was cut off by Intel.37
Citing Eastman Kodak, the trial court found that Intel had
unlawfully used its monopoly power in microprocessors to
leverage its power into the market for graphic subsystems.38 The
trial court further concluded that using economic leverage in one
market coercively to secure competitive advantage in another
market constituted unlawful reciprocal dealing.
Accordingly, the court concluded that Intel's overall course
of conduct, including its tying of a continued supply to
Intergraph of both Central Processing Units (CPU) and technical
information with its demand for Intergraph's relinquishment of
its Clipper technology patents without costs to Intel, was a form
of coercive reciprocity proscribed under both sections 1 and 2 of
the Sherman Act.39
The trial court in Intergraph thus concluded that Intel's
anticompetitive conduct could be attacked on several theories-
leveraging, reciprocity, tying, and monopolistic refusal to deal.40
The common thread in these theories is that Intel used its
monopoly power in microprocessors to exclude a rival in another
market.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court on
all counts and dissolved the injunction against Intel.41 One could
surely argue that based on the Federal Circuit reversal, the trial
court decision in Intergraph, as it addresses exclusionary
conduct by dominant firms-including refusals to deal,
leveraging and reciprocity-is a dead letter. It would, however,
be a mistake to write off the district court ruling in such a
cavalier fashion. The Federal Circuit's overarching rationale for
reversal was that Intel's acts directed at Intergraph did not, as a
matter of law, harm competition because Intel and Intergraph
were not competitors in microprocessors. 42  Far from rejecting
reciprocity as a basis for recovery under section 2 of the Sherman
36 See id. at 1267.
37 See id.
38 See id. at 1278.
39 See id. at 1279.
40 See id. at 1277-79.
41 See Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
42 See id. at 1353.
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Act, the Federal Circuit accepted the theory.43 Unfortunately,
the appellate court's specific discussion of reciprocity is at best
cursory and disappointing.
While the Federal Circuit criticizes the "terse holding"
below, it sheds little light on the law of reciprocal dealing.44 It
notes that Intel's conduct does not fit the classic reciprocal
dealing formula of "I'll buy from you, if you buy from me."45 In
Intergraph, Intel said to Intergraph "I'll sell to you, if and only if,
you provide technology on my terms."46 For that reason, the
appellate court treats Intel's allegedly coercive tactics as simply
failed negotiations for licensing Intergraph's Clipper
technology.47 Query whether the Federal Circuit's attempt to
distinguishing Intel's conduct from classic reciprocal dealing is
meaningful. Moreover, the Court of Appeals finds no record
evidence that competition was distorted in any market by Intel's
licensing proposals.48  Unfortunately, the decision contains
almost no analysis of the substantive reciprocity claims. Rather,
the Federal Circuit simply characterizes Intel's tactics as
"hardball" and states that "it is not the judicial role to readjust
the risks in high-stakes commercial dealings."49
In short, reciprocity as a theory of monopolistic conduct lives
to do battle another day. Notwithstanding its reversal, the trial
court's holding in Intergraph remains significant for antitrust
litigants for at least two reasons. First, the decision below on
reciprocity provides plaintiffs with an additional weapon for
their antitrust arsenal. The trial court could have viewed the
reciprocity claim as cumulative and ended its analysis with
leveraging. It may well be that the conduct in question would
have been subject to attack under section 2 as more generic
"exclusionary conduct." By recognizing reciprocity as an
independent theory of liability, the court is forcing defendants to
deal with a whole new range of factual and legal issues under
43 See id. at 1361.
4 See id.
45 Brokerage Concepts, Inc. v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 140 F.3d 494, 511 (3d Cir.
1998); see also Intergraph, 195 F.3d at 1361 (noting that a finding of reciprocal
dealing requires a presence of conspiracy).
46 Intergraph, 195 F. 3d at 1361.
47 See id.
48 See id.
49 Id. at 1362.
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section 2. The Federal Circuit ruling does not in any way
undermine, and indeed supports, this point. Second, in
condemning Intel's reciprocal dealing, the trial court applied a
per se rule. The per se rule provides the antitrust plaintiff with
distinct benefits. Most notably, under a per se analysis,
anticompetitive effect is presumed and need not be proven by the
plaintiff.50 In addition, the defendant is precluded from offering
evidence of procompetitive benefits of the acts in question and is
thus limited in the defenses that may be put forward.
In adhering to the per se standard, the trial court in
Integraph relied on case law that predated the Supreme Court's
decision in Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde5l on
tying issues.52 That case law is decidedly favorable to plaintiffs.
Query whether other courts will take a similar approach or will
those courts view reciprocity through a post-Hyde lens and
require detailed economic analysis of market data. The Federal
Circuit did not address this issue and thus has given lower
courts some leeway in deciding the issue. If the courts take the
latter approach, the plaintiffs' road to recovery will be rockier.
On the other hand, if the courts choose to follow the trial court in
Intergraph defending reciprocity claims under section 2 will
become even tougher.
III. TYING ANALOGY
A. Government Enforcement
A third legal basis for attacking reciprocal dealing practices
grew out of the law of tying. Government enforcement actions
arose in the context of specific business practices that had arisen
during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Companies, in order to
enhance sales, targeted suppliers as potential customers. Some
50 Intergraph Corp., 3 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1279 (1998).
51 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
52 See id. (following Betaseed Inc. v. U & I, Inc., 681 F.2d 1203 (9th Cir. 1982)
and Spartan Grain & Mill Co. v. Ayers, 581 F.2d 419 (5th Cir. 1978)). Both cases
were cited for the proposition that "[clourts have held that coercive reciprocity is a
per se violation of the antitrust laws because of its pernicious effect and economic
similarity to illegal tying cases." Intergraph, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 1279. The court also
cited Betaseed in reasoning that once a per se violation is established "no specific
showing of anticompetitive effect is necessary." Id. (citing Betaseed, 681 F.2d at
1228).
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firms created an office of trade relations or customer relations to
monitor purchasing activity and, based on purchasing activity,
aggressively promoted sales to suppliers. In at least some cases,
the strategy worked, giving rise to claims by the government
that reciprocal dealing had, in fact, unlawfully excluded rival
sellers from making sales. As noted, the government was able to
obtain consent decrees in most cases. 53 The decree contained
provisions which would (1) abolish the office of trade relations,
requiring separation of the purchasing and selling functions, and
(2) bar reciprocal dealing in the future.
As also pointed out above, the Antitrust Division, under
Thomas Kauper, ceased bringing reciprocity actions in the
second term of the Nixon Administration. 54 The Antitrust
Division re-evaluated reciprocity and came to the view that it
was not invariably anticompetitive. Put another way, in absence
of some showing of actual anticompetitive effects, reciprocity
ought not to be condemned. This approach mirrors the views of
Professor Areeda,55 discussed below, that reciprocity should not
be condemned as per se unlawful.
B. Private Enforcement
In the private sector, reciprocity actions historically have
also relied on the law of tying, and the courts have recognized
that the competitive harm caused by reciprocal dealing is closely
akin to that caused by tying:
[Tihe two labels (tying and reciprocal dealings) refer to similar
phenomena: In each case one side of a transaction has special
power in the market place. It uses this power to force those
with whom it deals to make concessions in another market. In
tying arrangements, a seller with economic power forces the
purchaser to purchase something else to obtain the desired
item. In reciprocal dealings a buyer with economic power forces
a seller to buy something from it to sell its goods. In both cases,
the key is the extension of economic power in one market to
another market. 56
53 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
54 See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
55 See PHILLIP E. AREEDA, HERBERT HOVENKAMP & EINER ELHAUGE, X
ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION
1777 (1996) [hereinafter AREEDA].
56 Spartan Grain & Mill Co. v. Ayers, 581 F.2d 419, 425 (5th Cir. 1978).
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Yet, there remains a crucial difference in the law of tying
and the law of reciprocal dealing. Over time, the law of tying
has developed and has been refined through court decisions,
most notably, Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde.57
While the Hyde majority nominally adheres to the per se
standard for tying, it adopts a de facto rule of reason approach
by requiring a detailed market analysis to ascertain market
power in all tying cases.58 In marked contrast to the extensive
case law development in the tying area, the law on reciprocal
dealing has stagnated and remains largely undeveloped. 59 In
part, this is due to the fact that government enforcement actions
were almost universally resolved administratively by consent
decree so that public sector cases had no opportunity to percolate
through the judicial system. This is also due to the fact that
reciprocity, as a theory of antitrust wrongdoing, fell out of favor
with enforcement agencies, private litigants and courts during
the Chicago School antitrust revolution of the 1980s. As a result,
much of the authority available to courts on reciprocity issues is
pre-Hyde, and hence suspect. The Supreme Court has not
addressed reciprocal dealing in the context of a section 1
Sherman Act violation.
C. Per Se Analysis
The lower courts, borrowing from the law of tying, have
analyzed reciprocal dealing under both the per se rule and the
rule of reason. To establish a per se violation, plaintiff must
prove (1) an agreement conditioning the purchase of a product on
the sale of another product; (2) market power sufficient to force
the plaintiff to do something it would do in a competitive market;
and (3) anticompetitive effect.
567 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
58 See id. at 34.
59 See, e.g., Brokerage Concepts, Inc. v. U.S. Healthcare Inc., 140 F.3d 494 (3d
Cir. 1998) (noting that the Third Circuit has no test for the legality of reciprocal
dealing); Betaseed Inc. v. U & I, Inc. 681 F.2d 1203, 1221 (9th Cir. 1982) (stating
that "It]he similarity between coercive reciprocity and tying arrangements, both in
form an in anticompetitive consequences, leads to the conclusion that the two
practices should be judged by similar standards"); Spartan Grain & Mill Co. v.
Ayers, 581 F.2d 419, 425 (5th Cir. 1978) (opining that the label of "tying" or
"reciprocal dealing" is irrelevant; per se rule applies to both); E.T. Barwick Indus. v.
Walter E. Heller & Co., 692 F. Supp. 1337 (N.D. Ga. 1987), affd, 891 F.2d 906 (11th
Cir. 1989).
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1. Agreement
It is fundamental that some level of agreement involving
two products is necessary to meet the "contract, combination or
conspiracy" requirement of section 1 of the Sherman Act.60
Under the tying analysis, the wrongdoer conditions the sale of
one product (the tying product) on the purchaser's willingness to
buy a second product (the tied product). In the context of
reciprocity, the agreement prong is met by a showing that
purchases are made as a quid pro quo for sales. Fortuitous or
incidental purchases from the customer of a seller do not
constitute an agreement within the meaning of section 1 of the
Sherman Act. Where a quid pro quo can be shown, the courts
further distinguish between "coercive" and "mutual" reciprocity.
Coercive reciprocity arises from imbalance in market power and
permits the larger trading partner to take advantage of the
smaller. Mutual reciprocity occurs where both trading partners
perceive an advantage in the reciprocal dealing arrangement.61
2. Market Power
Market power is the key element in proving coercive
reciprocity; absent market power, there is no plausible basis for
arguing coercion. The tying cases have held that a plaintiff must
establish sufficient economic power in the market for the tying
product appreciably to restrain commerce in the market for the
tied product. 62 In Hyde, the Supreme Court held that the
essence of market power was the seller's ability to force a
purchaser to do something that it would not do in a competitive
market.63  The Court said that market power could be
established in several ways: (1) a dominant market share; (2) a
patent; or (3) a unique product that rivals cannot offer.64 In
Hyde, the Court concluded that a 30% share of the relevant
market was insufficient to permit anticompetitive forcing,65 and
that surgical services were not sufficiently unique to confer
60 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1999).
61 See generally AREEDA, supra note 57, at T 1777.
62 See Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
63 See Hyde, 466 U.S. at 16-17.
64 See id.
65 See id. at 7.
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market power.66 Subsequently, in Eastman Kodak the Supreme
Court concluded that requisite market power may exist where
high switching costs effectively "lock-in" the buyer to the bundled
goods. 67
Translated to reciprocal dealing, the test is whether the
buyer has sufficient economic power in the market in which it
purchases appreciably to restrain commerce in the market in
which it sells.68 Clearly, this standard is met where the buyer
controls a dominant share of the relevant market. The reciprocal
dealing cases have held that actual coercion need not be shown
but may be implied from the fact that many sellers have
accepted burdensome terms. 69 While lower courts in tying cases
have adopted a similar position,70 the view that economic power
may be inferred from the existence of the tie-in arrangements
has been discredited by the Supreme Court in Hyde.71 A court
reviewing a reciprocal dealing arrangement anew may very well
take a different approach.
3. Anticompetitive Effect
When a case falls within the per se pigeonhole,
anticompetitive effect is presumed and need not be shown.72
Again relying on the tying cases, courts in reciprocal dealing
cases have held that the anticompetitive effect prong is met
where a "not insubstantial" volume of commerce is affected. 73
That threshold is relatively low and poses no substantial
obstacles to a reciprocal dealing action.
Courts have viewed the anticompetitive effects of coercive
reciprocity as similar to those of tying and applied a per se rule.74
66 See id. at 43.
67 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 472-73
(1992).
68 See Betaseed Inc.v. U & I, Inc., 681 F.2d 1203, 1222-23 (9th Cir. 1982).
69 See id.
70 See, e.g., Moore v. Jas. H. Mathews & Co., 550 F.2d 1207, 1216-17 (9th Cir.
1977).
71 See Hyde, 466 U.S. at 34.
72 See id.
73 Id. at 8; see also Intl Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 932, 936 (1947)
(stating that "agreements are forbidden which 'tend to create a monopoly,' and it is
immaterial that the tendency is a creeping one rather than one that proceeds at a
full gallop").
74 See Betaseed, 681 F.2d at 1216-17.
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Like tying, coercive reciprocity (1) erodes traditional purchasing
criteria of price, quality and service; (2) forecloses rivals who are
without market leverage; and (3) fosters creation of monopolistic
or oligopolistic market conditions.75 In both cases, the key is the
extension of economic power in one market to another.7 6 Indeed,
it is the imbalance in market power that effectuates the
"anticompetitive forcing" characteristic of coercive reciprocity.77
Surprisingly, even in those courts applying this lenient per
se liability standard, decisions condemning reciprocity have been
few in number. Courts have denied recovery based on:
(1) absence of market power or coercion;78 (2) lack of motive to
engage in reciprocity;7 9 (3) transactions not involving separate
products;80 (4) insufficient amount of commerce foreclosed;81 and
(5) inability to prove a contract combination or conspiracy.8 2
On the other hand, in cases of mutual reciprocity, where
coercion by definition is lacking, courts have generally eschewed
per se analysis and looked carefully for proof of anticompetitive
effect.83  Where anticompetitive effect is lacking, mutual
reciprocal dealing arrangements have been upheld.8 4
D. Rule of Reason
The focus of the antitrust analysis under the rule of reason
is two-fold: first, the existence of actual, as opposed to presumed,
anticompetitive effects caused by the conduct in question; and
second, whether the anticompetitive effects are outweighed by
the procompetitive benefits of the conduct.8 5 The potential
anticompetitive effects of reciprocity have been detailed above.
75 See id. at 1220-21.
76 See id. at 1218.
7 Id. at 1216.
78 See, e.g., Great Escape, Inc. v. Union City Body Co., 791 F.2d 532, 537-38
(7th Cir. 1986).
79 See, e.g., DeVoto v. Pac. Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 618 F.2d 1340, 1346 (9th Cir.
1980).
80 See, e.g., Ryals v. Natl Car Rental Sys., 404 F. Supp. 481, 486-87 (D. Minn.
1975).
81 See, e.g., Great Escape, 791 F.2d at 540.
82 See, e.g., United States v. Empire Cross Corp., 393 F. Supp. 903, 914-15
(W.D. Mo. 1975), affd, 537 F.2d 296 (8th Cir. 1976).
83 See, e.g., Great Escape, 791 F.2d at 540.
84 See id. at 539.
85 Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
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Whether reciprocity has any procompetitive benefits is a matter
of some intellectual debate. Proponents of per se condemnation
of reciprocal dealing would obviously argue that such
procompetitive benefits are non-existent or invariably
outweighed by anticompetitive effects.
On the other hand, Professor Areeda has catalogued a series
of potential procompetitive benefits of reciprocal dealing.
According to Professor Areeda reciprocity may:
a. Create production or transaction economies;
b. Permit optimal output at plants to be maintained;
c. Reduce any risk of expansion and promote stability;
d. Permit better quality control;
e. Thwart cartel or oligopolistic behavior by enabling sellers
to disguise price reductions and thereby effectively cheat on the
cartel.86
Even if the foregoing effects can be proven as a matter of
fact, it is questionable whether any of the benefits-alone or in
combination-are sufficiently weighty to balance the potential
anticompetitive effects of reciprocal dealing. The first three
"benefits" would appear to be the same as any cartel would
produce. The fourth justification-quality control-has long
been discredited in the tying context. The fifth justification
appears more theoretical than real. There would appear to be
more efficient ways to thwart cartel behavior than reciprocal
dealing: specifically, by non-participation or by prosecution.
Nevertheless, Areeda would reject a per se approach to
reciprocity and favor a structured rule of reason analysis
focusing on: (1) the existence of an agreement; (2) a theory
explaining how price and/or output are adversely affected; (3)
facts triggering that theory; and (4) the severity of the harm to
competition.8 7
Areeda is not alone in his criticism of reciprocity. Chicago
School writers, who view reciprocity as a form of tying, have also
demeaned the notion that reciprocity is anticompetitive.88 In
their view, if a firm has sufficient market to exact a
supracompetitive price for its product, it should make no
difference whether the firm chooses to exact its premium from
86 See AREEDA, supra note 57, 1777, at 456-60.
87 See id.
88 See Easterbrook, supra note 10, at 144-45.
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that product alone or by bundling that product with another
good. 89  Accordingly, tying and reciprocity theories involve
"double counting" of defendant's alleged wrongdoing. While this
view has gained a following in the antitrust community, it has
not faired well in the courts and indeed was rejected by the
Supreme Court in Eastman Kodak90 At the end of the day, the
Chicago School is correct that tying and reciprocity should be
treated the same analytically under the antitrust laws.
However, under that view, if tying is harmful to competition,
then so is reciprocity.
CONCLUSION
Reciprocity has come back to life after three decades of
hibernation as a new weapon to attack monopolistic behavior.
Its contours remain largely undefined; and it is not yet clear
whether, and the extent to which, the courts will embrace this
theory. Antitrust practitioners should prepare themselves to
deal with the new law of reciprocity.
89 See id. at 143-45.
90 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 472-73
(1992).
[Vol.75:633
